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Abstract
We show that supply functions cannot be classied as either strategic com-
plements or substitutes according to the twofold criterion advanced by Bulow
et al. (1985). This is because while the slope of the best reply is univocally
positive, this is not the case with the sign of the cross derivative of marginal
prot. We rst show this discrepancy in the original Klemperer and Meyer
(1989) setting, and then in a linear-quadratic model of di¤erentiated duopoly.
We further conrm and strengthen our result by proving that the game in
supply functions is neither supermodular nor submodular.
JEL Codes: D43, L13
Keywords: supply function; lattice theory; strategic complements; strate-
gic substitutes; super/submodularity
1 Introduction
In a widely cited paper, Bulow et al. (1985) introduce an important criterion
to classify the strategic nature of di¤erent choice variables in oligopolistic
games. Borrowing a well established terminology from demand theory, they
identify a binary taxonomy opposing strategic complements to strategic sub-
stitutes. Focusing on price or quantity competition in a single market, it
turns out that one may detect the strategic nature of a choice variable by
looking at the sign of the rst derivative of the reaction function (the slope)
or at the sign of the second mixed derivative of the payo¤ function, for both
derivatives share the same sign under fairly general regularity conditions.
If such a sign is positive, then the choice variable is said to be a strategic
complement (e.g., price); if it is negative, the choice variable is said to be
a strategic substitute (e.g., output). This taxonomy belongs by now to the
advanced Industrial Organization jargon (see, for instance, Tirole, 1988 or
Vives, 1999).
The main question addressed in this paper deals with the classication of
supply functions. Competition in supply functions represent an interesting
alternative to price and/or quantity competition when modelling oligopolistic
market games. After the pioneering contributions by Grossman (1981) and
especially Klemperer andMeyer (1989), the literature on supply functions has
been growing, also because of the widespread opinion that supply function
competition ts better than price or quantity competition our understanding
of some key sectors (e.g., wholesale electricity).1
We approach our central question rst in the original Klempeer and
Meyer (1989) setting, and then within a model of (exogenously) di¤eren-
tiated duopoly where we concentrate on linear supply functions. When per-
forming the test needed to classify the strategic nature of supply functions,
1See, for instance, Delgado and Moreno (2004), Ciarreta and Gutierrez-Hita (2006),
Vives (2011), Holmberg et al. (2013), Delbono and Lambertini (2015a,b). For an inter-
esting sample of the huge applied literature, see Bolle (1992) and Green and Newbery
(1982).
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we show that while the sign of the reaction function slope is unambiguously
positive, the sign of the second mixed derivative of the prot function may
not be taken for granted. Except along the best reply, the latter sign may
indeed be both positive and negative. Hence, as opposed to what happens
with both price and quantity competition, under supply function competi-
tion there seem to be a discrepancy between the two (apparently equivalent)
tests involved in the above classication. This discrepancy poses an obvious
problem. Only after a detailed investigation of the second mixed derivative
of the prot function, we succeed to establish that in the admissible range of
the parameters its sign is positive too. However, we may not conclude that
supply functions are strategic complements because the variation of marginal
prots has not the same sign over the whole strategy space. This is conrmed
by the lattice theory approach (Tarski, 1955; Topkis, 1978; 1979), whereby
we show that the ultimate explanation of the general discrepancy between
the two signs lies in the supply function game being not supermodular.2
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we use the Klem-
perer and Meyer (1989) model and we perform the analysis needed to test the
strategic nature of supply functions along the lines of Bulow et al. (1985).
In section 3 we set up a linear-quadratic version of the Singh and Vives
(1984) model which can be analytically solved in linear supply functions, as
illustrated in section 4. In section 5, we use the tools of lattice theory to
generalize and motivate our ndings. Section 6 concludes.
2 Preliminaries
We start from the original model of Klemperer and Meyer (1989). They
assume that the industry demand curve is Q = D (p) ; where D (p) is twice
continuously di¤erentiable, strictly decreasing and concave in price p; over
the relevant price range wherein D (p)  0. The industry is a duopoly in
2For more on supermodular games, see Vives (1990), Milgrom and Roberts (1990) and
Milgrom and Shannon (1994), inter alia.
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which rms have identical cost functions C (qi) ; with C 0 (qi) ; C
00
(qi)  0 for
all qi  0: Each rms chooses its supply function Si (p) under the market
clearing condition D (p) = Si (p)+Sj (p) ; assuming unicity of the market-
clearing price p. Firm is prot function is therefore dened as i (p) =
pSi (p)  C (Si (p)) ; which, under market clearing, writes as follows:
i (p) = p [D (p)  Sj (p)]  C (D (p)  Sj (p)) (1)
Firm is problem consists in maximising (1) w.r.t. p, which implies solving
the following rst order condition (FOC):
@i (p)
@p
= D (p) Sj (p) + [p  C 0 (D (p)  Sj (p))]

D0 (p)  S 0j (p)

= 0 (2)
to obtain
S 0j (p) =
qi
p  C 0 (qi)
+D0 (p) (3)
where Sj (p) = qj and consequently qi = D (p) Sj (p) : As in Klemperer and
Meyer (1989, p. 1248), we shall conne our attention to the case in which
S 0j (p)  0, i.e., supply functions are required to have non-negative slopes at
p = p, where p is a market-clearing price granting a positive mark-up.
We now try to detect whether supply functions are strategic complements
or substitutes by using the twofold test introduced by Bulow et al. (1985).
Accordingly, we must (i) identify the best reply function of rm i in the
space of supply functions and check the sign of its slope w.r.t. the rivals; (ii)
determine the sign of the partial derivative of rm is marginal prot w.r.t.
the rivals supply function; and (iii) compare the two signs. If the argument
put forward by Bulow et al. (1985) in the space of either prices or quantities
holds true also in the space of supply functions, the two signs should coincide,
allowing one to establish the strategic nature of supply functions.
As a rst step, we pose D (p)   Sj (p) = Si (p) in (2) and then solve it
w.r.t. Si (p) to obtain the best reply of rm i to the rivals supply function:
Si (p) =   (p  C 0 (D (p)  Sj (p)))
 
D0 (p)  S 0j (p)

(4)
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The partial derivative of Si (p) w.r.t. Sj (p) is
@Si (p)
@Sj (p)
=    D0 (p)  S 0j (p)C 0 (D (p)  Sj (p))  0 (5)
because D0 (p)  S 0j (p) < 0 as D0 (p) < 0 and S 0j (p)  0. Hence, best replies
in the supply function space are non-decreasing.
The second step amounts to evaluating the sign of the second cross deriv-
ative
@2i (p)
@Si (p) @Sj (p)
(6)
measuring the e¤ect of a change in Sj (p) on rm is marginal prot @i (p) =@Si (p).
The latter obtains by observing that
@i (p)
@p
=
@i (p)
@Si (p)
 @Si (p)
@p
(7)
which rewrites as
@i (p)
@p
=
@i (p)
@Si (p)
 S 0i (p) (8)
where S 0i (p) = @Si (p) =@p. Consequently, provided Si (p) is invertible,
@i (p)
@Si (p)
=
@i (p)
@p
 @p
@Si
=
@i (p)
@p
 1
S 0i (p)
= (9)
D (p)  Sj (p) + [p  C 0 (D (p)  Sj (p))]

D0 (p)  S 0j (p)

D0 (p)  S 0j (p)
for any market-clearing price. Di¤erentiating (9) w.r.t. Sj (p) ; we get:
@2i (p)
@Si (p) @Sj (p)
=
 1 +  D0 (p)  S 0j (p)C 0 (D (p)  Sj (p))
D0 (p)  S 0j (p)
(10)
The r.h.s. of (10) is strictly positive for p = p as S 0j (p)  0; for the same
reasons whereby (5) is non-negative. However, since here we are considering
any market clearing price, there may exist price levels p 6= p at which S 0j (p) <
0 and therefore (10) may change sign.
The above analysis boils down to the following conclusion. Unlike what
happens in the space of prices or quantities, here the two tests suggested
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by Bulow et al. (1985) do not provide systematically the same answer for
any price level ensuring market-clearing. Hence, we cannot conclude, in
general, whether supply functions are strategic complements or substitutes.
To disentangle this issue, we turn to a linear quadratic model.
3 The linear-quadratic model
As a workhorse, we consider the model of di¤erentiated duopoly introduced
by Singh and Vives (1984). The utility function of the representative con-
sumer is
U = a (q1 + q2)  1
2
 
q21 + q
2
2 + 2q1q2

(11)
where qi is the quantity of the variety supplied by rm i = 1; 2; a > 0 and
parameter  2 (0; 1] measures the degree of product substitutability, i.e., 
is an inverse measure of product di¤erentiation. When  = 1; the product is
homogeneous.3 The direct demand functions resulting from the constrained
maximisation problem are:
qi = max

0;
a
1 + 
  pi
1  2 +
pj
1  2

; i = 1; 2: (12)
System (12) can be inverted to yield the direct demand system:
pi = a  qi   qj; i = 1; 2: (13)
On the supply side, both single-product rms operate with the convex
cost function Ci = cq2i =2, with c > 0: The prot function of rm i is
i = piqi   cq
2
i
2
(14)
To model competition in supply functions, for the sake of simplicity, we
focus on linear supply functions. To this end, we follow the procedure illus-
trated in Ciarreta and Gutierrez-Hita (2006). The supply function of rm i
3If  = 0, the two varieties do not interact and rms are separate monopolists. We also
disregard the range  2 [ 1; 0) ; where products are complements.
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is dened as Si = ipi; and the ex ante market clearing condition is Si = qi,
where qi is dened as in (12). The presence of two varieties requires imposing
two market-clearing conditions. Taking the individual demand function in
(12), whenever qi > 0; market clearing requires imposing ipi = qi:
ipi =
a
1 + 
  pi
1  2 +
pj
1  2 (15)
Solving system (15) w.r.t. pi and pj; the resulting market-clearing prices are:
pi =
a

1 + (1  ) j

1 + j +

1 + j (1  2)

i
(16)
The prot function of rm i therefore writes as
i = piSi   cS
2
i
2
= ip
2
i  
c2i p
2
i
2
(17)
where pi is (16).
Competition in supply function takes place in the space (1; 2) ; with
1; 2 > 0. The FOC for the maximisation of (17) w.r.t. i is:
@i
@i
=
a2

1 + (1  ) j
2 
1 + j  
 
1 + c+ (1 + c  2) j

i

1 + j +
 
1 + (1  2) j

i
3 = 0 (18)
which generates the following best reply function:4
i
 
j

=
1 + j
1 + c+ (1 + c  2) j
(19)
4 Testing linear supply functions
We now investigate the strategic nature of supply functions. From (19), one
easily veries that the slope of the reaction function is
@i
 
j

@j
=
2
1 + c+ (1 + c  2) j
2 (20)
4The second order condition, which is omitted for brevity, is satised in correspondence
of i = 

i
 
j

.
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which is clearly positive everywhere. Therefore, best replies are increasing,
which, in the jargon dating back to Bulow et al. (1985), corresponds to
the case of strategic complementarity. However, in the present setting, this
derivative is
@2i
@i@j
=
a2

1  (1  2) j


1 + j +
 
1 + (1  2) j

i
4 (21)
where
  2i

2 (1  )  c (3   2) + (1  ) 2  1  2+ c (2  ) j+
i

4
 
1 + j (1  )

+ 2c
 
1 + j
  2  1 + j (22)
To ease the exposition, dene
  2 (1  )  c (3   2) + (1  ) 2  1  2+ c (2  ) j (23)
Then clearly,
 @2i=@i@j is convex (resp., concave) in i if  > 0 (resp.,  < 0)
and
 the sign of (21) is the sign of , which is equal to zero in correspondence
of
i =  
c+ 2 + (c+ 2 (1  )) j 
p
	
2 (1  )  c (3   2) + (1  ) [2 (1  2) + c (2  )] j
(24)
where
	  2  1 + j  2 +  2  1  2+ c (2  ) j (1  ) + c (2  3)+
c
 
1 + j

+ 2
 
1 + (1  ) j
2
(25)
Now note that
i+   i  =  
p
	

(26)
where the sign of the denominator may change precisely when @2i=@i@j
changes from convex to concave. As it is shown in appendix, 	 > 0; so that
i+ 6= i  and i+; i  2 R. Looking at , it appears that
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Lemma 1  2 (0; 2=3] su¢ ces to ensure  > 0; therefore, in the same range,
i  > i+ and @
2i=@i@j > 0 outside the interval

i+; i 

. Instead,
 2 (2=3; 1] is necessary but not su¢ cient to yield i+ > i .
Let us now focus on the range  2 (2=3; 1]. Here, in the denominator of
(24), 2 (1  )  c (3   2) < 0 for all
c >
2 (1  )
3   2  bc  08 2 (2=3; 1] (27)
Then, for all c > bc;  R 0 for all
j R
c (3   2)  2 (1  )
(1  ) [2 (1  2) + c (2  )] 
bj > 0 (28)
and bj > bc 8 c > 2 (1  3) + 42 (2  ) (1 + 2)  2  ec  08 2 (2=3; 1] (29)
Moreover, ec  bc 8 2 (2=3; 1]. This produces the graph in Figure 1, whereec and bc are drawn. The signs appearing in the four relevant regions are the
sign of @2i=@i@j.
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Figure 1 The sign of @2i=@i@j
6
-
c

(0; 0) 2=3 1
+
+
+  
bc ec
The foregoing analysis boils down to the following
Proposition 2 For all  2 (2=3; 1] and c > ec; @2i=@i@j < 0, while
@2i=@i@j > 0 anywhere else.
This result illustrates that, while in a standard duopoly model where
under Bertrand or Cournot competition the second cross derivative of prots
has the same sign everywhere, under supply function competition this does
not apply in general. Moreover, again under Bertrand or Cournot behaviour,
the sign of the second cross derivative of prots coincides with the sign of
the slope of the best reply function. This, in general, does not hold under
supply function competition. However, substituting the best reply (19) into
9
(21), or equivalently into (22), one obtains:
ji=i (j) =

 
1 + j
 
1 + (1  ) j
 
2 + c+ (2 (1  2) + c) j

1 + c+ (1 + c  2) j
2 > 0
(30)
everywhere. Hence, along the best reply the sign of (20) and (21) is indeed
the same. To explain this result, without further ado, one can easily locate
i
 
j

w.r.t. i+ and i . It turns out that:
 if  > 0, then i
 
j

> i  > i+;
 if  < 0, then i
 
j
 2  max0; i 	 ; i+ :
These alternative scenarios are represented in Figure 2a,b.
Figure 2a The case  > 0
6
-
@2i=@i@j
i
i+ i  

 (j)
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Figure 2b The case  < 0
6
-
@2i=@i@j
i
i  i+

 (j)
So far, we have proved that the equivalence between the two criteria
suggested by Bulow et al. (1985) to detect whether strategic variables are
complements or substitutes stop holding true under supply function com-
petition. Indeed, while the sign of the slope of the best reply is univocally
positive (suggesting the presence of strategic complementarity), the sign of
the second cross derivative of prots is not (although it is positive along the
best reply). This discrepancy between the two signs, in particular the fact
that the e¤ect of a change in a players strategy on the opponents marginal
prots has not the same sign everywhere, prevents one from classifying the
present game as one in which either strategic complementarity or strategic
substitutability prevails.
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The acquired wisdom (see, e.g., Vives, 1999) holds that if the two signs
are both positive (negative) everywhere, so that strategic variables are com-
plements (substitutes), then the game is supermodular (submodular) in the
jargon of lattice theory. Since, in the present setting, the two signs do not
coincide everywhere, the direct implication stemming from the above argu-
ment is that the game played in the space of supply functions may not be
classied as either supermodular or submodular. This analysis is carried out
in the next section.
5 The lattice approach to supply function com-
petition
The property of strategic complementarity is captured by both supermod-
ularity and increasing di¤erences. The latter concept is dened as follows.
Let X be a lattice and  a partially ordered set. The function i (xi; xj) :
X   ! R has (strictly) increasing di¤erences in its arguments xi and xj
if i (xi; xj)   i
 
xi; x
0
j

is (strictly) increasing in xi for all xj  x0j. By re-
placing increasingwith decreasingone obtains the denition of decreasing
di¤erences.
The concept of supermodularity is stronger than that of increasing dif-
ferences. However, if the function  (xi; xj) is dened over a product of
ordered sets, the two coincide. Moreover, if i (xi; xj) is twice continu-
ously di¤erentiable over the space X, then  (xi; xj) is supermodular i¤
@ (xi; xj) =@xi@xj  0 for all xi; xj 2 X; j 6= i (see Vives, 1999, pp. 24-
25). The latter is nothing but one of the two conditions by which Bulow
et al. (1985) identify equivalently strategic complementarity, the other one
being increasing best replies.
In lattice theory, the function  (xi; xj) is supermodular (submodular) i¤
(see Amir, 1996, p. 135, inequality (1.1)):
 (xiA; xjA)   (xiB; xjA)  () (xiA; xjB)   (xiB; xjB) (31)
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for all xiA  xiB and xjA  xjB:
Now we pose xi = i and xj = j; iA = jA = A; iB = jB = B;
with A  B: Then, we use the prot function (17). Accordingly, dropping
the index as it is redundant, we have
 (A; A) =
a2A (2  cA)
2 [1 + A (1 + )]
2 (32)
 (B; B) =
a2B (2  cB)
2 [1 + B (1 + )]
2 (33)
 (A; B) =
a2A (2  cA) [1 + B (1  )]2
2 [1 + B + A (1 + B (1  2))]2
(34)
 (B; A) =
a2B (2  cB) [1 + A (1  )]2
2 [1 + B + A (1 + B (1  2))]2
(35)
so that (31) becomes:
 (A; A)   (B; A)  () (A; B)   (B; B) (36)
Now treating (36) as a strict equality and solving it for A, we have that the
resulting equation
 (A; A)   (B; A) =  (A; B)   (B; B) (37)
can be rewritten as
 (B; c; ) 
2
A + 
(B; c; ) A +  (B; c; ) = 0 (38)
where  () ; 
 () and  () are polynomials. Moreover,
 (B; c; )  c (2 + ) + 2B (1 + ) [2 + 3c+  (1  )]
+22B (1 + )
2 2  1  2+ c (2  ) > 0: (39)
Equation (38) is solved by A = B and
A =
 B [2c (2 + ) + B] + 2 +    c [1 + B (1 + )]p
2B (1 + ) (+ 3c) + c (2 + )
(40)
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where
  (1 + ) [2 + 3c+  (1  )] (41)
  (2 + c+ )2 + 2B

4 (1 + ) + c2   52 (1 + ) + c  2 (2 + )  32
+2B

(2 +  (1  ))2 + c2  1 + 22+ 2c  2  1 + 3+  (1 + ) (42)
  (1 + ) 2   + B  2  1  2+ c (2  s) (43)
It can be easily established that the expressions of A in (40) have the fol-
lowing properties:
+A

B=0
> 0 >  A

B=0
(44)
and
@+A
@B
;
@ A
@B
< 0 (45)
everywhere. Additionally, +A R B for all
B Q
p
4 (1 + c) + c2   32   c  
c (2  ) + 2 (1  2) > 0 (46)
for all c > 0 and all  2 (0; 1].
Since we have to conne to A  B and, from (39), we know that
 () > 0, the following holds:
Proposition 3 For all A  max

+A; B
	
;
 (A; A)   (B; A)   (A; B)   (B; B)
For all A 2

B; 
+
A

;
 (A; A)   (B; A)   (A; B)   (B; B)
Therefore, since the sign of (36) is not univocally determined over the
entire admissible strategy space, we may conclude that the game in supply
functions is neither supermodular nor submodular. Proposition 3 is illus-
trated in Figure 3, where we must conne to the sub-space A > B, in
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which the intersection between the 45-degree line and +A identies two re-
gions. In region I,  (A; A)    (B; A)   (A; B)    (B; B); in
region II,  (A; A)   (B; A)   (A; B)   (B; B).
Figure 3 Inequality  (A; A)   (B; A)  () (A; B)   (B; B)
in the space (B; A)
6
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 
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 
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6 Concluding remarks
In quantity- and price-setting oligopolies, strategic variables are either strate-
gic substitutes or complements (Bulow et al., 1985) and the games are either
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submodular or supermodular, respectively (e.g., Vives, 1999). We have ad-
dressed the same issue under supply function competition (Klemperer and
Meyer, 1989). The foregoing analysis has shown that supply functions can
labelled as neither strategic complements nor substitutes, because, notwith-
standing that the slope of the best reply is always positive, the sign of the
cross derivative of marginal prot changes. This conclusion has been con-
rmed using the lattice-theoretical approach, from which there emerges that
the game in the space of supply functions is neither supermodular nor sub-
modular.
Appendix
The expression (25) can be rewritten as
	 = 8
 
1 + j
 
2 (1  )  1 +  1  2 j+ c  2  3 + (2  ) (1  ) j
+4

c
 
1 + j

+ 2
 
1 + j (1  )
2
(a1)
Therefore, if
8
 
1 + j
 
2 (1  )  1 +  1  2 j+ c  2  3 + (2  ) (1  ) j  0
(a2)
then (a1) is positive, so that roots A 2 R surely. Otherwise, if (a2) is
negative, we may again rewrite (a1) to obtain
	 = 42j

c2 + 2c (2   (1 + )) + 4 (1  )2 (1 +  (1 + ))
+8j

c2 + 2 (1  )  2 + 2+ c (4   (2 + ))
+4

(2 + c) (c+ 2 (1  )) + 42 (a3)
Solving 	 = 0 w.r.t. j, we obtain
j =
f (c; ) 2 [c+ 2 (1  )]p3i
g (c; )
(a4)
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where f (c; ) and g (c; ) are polynomials in c and  and i is the imaginary
unit. Consequently, equation 	 = 0 has no real roots and 	 has the same
sign of the coe¢ cient of 2j in (a3):
c2 + 2c (2   (1 + )) + 4 (1  )2 (1 +  (1 + )) (a5)
which is positive for all c > 0 and  2 (0; 1]. This proves that, indeed,
i+ 6= i  and i+; i  2 R.
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